Sardarapat: the railway battle that helped protect YerevanMay 1918

On 21 May 1918, Ottoman forces took the village and station of Sardarapat on the Ararat plain. On 22 May an Armenian counterattack recovered them. If the story ended there, students could reasonably ask why the battle is remembered as a campaign lasting several more days. The answer lies farther along the railway. The retreating troops regrouped near Araks station, where nearby heights offered positions from which to resist another advance. Retaking Sardarapat had opened a possibility; the defenders still had to turn it into lasting protection for the approaches to Yerevan.

The battle took place during the First World War, before the end of the Ottoman Empire and before the establishment of the present Republic of Turkey. In 1917 revolutions transformed Russia, and the Russian imperial army on the Caucasian front disintegrated. Many soldiers left their positions. Armenian units, former imperial servicemen, and volunteers faced the task of holding routes that a much larger military organization had previously defended.

Imagine planning to send a field gun, its ammunition, food for a unit, and wounded people in the opposite direction. Each load poses a different difficulty. A gun requires a usable route; shells are heavy; food must arrive repeatedly; wounded people need space and care. Railway lines and the roads beside them therefore mattered to both armies even when no train could safely run through the fighting.

On 16 May, Armenian Corps commander Tovmas Nazarbekian entrusted the defense of the Yerevan region to Movses Silikyan, commander of the Yerevan detachment. Daniel Bek-Pirumyan commanded the Sardarapat group. Poghos Bek-Pirumyan, a different officer, led its Fifth Regiment. The History Museum of Armenia preserves a photograph identified with that regiment. A similar surname can easily produce a serious error: a regiment was part of a larger group, not another name for the whole force.

The loss of the station on 21 May brought the threat closer to the settlements of the plain. On the following day the Sardarapat group attacked and recovered the station and village. Regular infantry, artillery, and supporting units had to work together. A gun could disrupt an opposing position, but infantry still had to move, maintain contact, and occupy ground. Courage mattered, but it could not substitute for ammunition, timing, or a clear understanding of the objective.

The Ottoman forces that withdrew from Sardarapat established a new line around the approaches to Araks station and nearby heights. An army that retreats from one point can preserve its organization, receive reinforcements, and exploit another position. This is why the days following the first success mattered. They tested whether the Armenian forces could maintain pressure without losing the advantages they had gained.

On 27 May Armenian troops renewed their attack. The Khznauz detachment under Karo Hasan-Pashayan carried out a movement against the Ottoman flank. Combined with pressure from the main Armenian force, the maneuver helped break resistance around the heights and Araks station. Ottoman troops withdrew. The memorial museum’s account follows the Armenian advance through 29 May, when forward units reached the line of Aghin station and Sogutlu village.

When sources describe a population rising to defend the region, translate that broad statement into actual tasks. A fighting unit needed bread, water, transport, medical attention, information, and replacements. Local officials had to decide where supplies were required and how to prevent roads from becoming unusable. Families had to decide whether to move or stay, often without reliable knowledge of the next day’s front.

Sardarapat was one of three major confrontations in May 1918. At Bash Aparan, Armenian forces under Drastamat Kanayan, known as Dro, defended the northern approach toward Yerevan. At Karakilisa, now Vanadzor, Armenian forces fought a costly battle in a mountain valley and eventually withdrew. The three fronts should be studied together because decisions on one affected the others, but their battlefield outcomes were not identical.

The defense of the approaches to Yerevan helped preserve the territory and population from which an Armenian state could function. The collapse of the Transcaucasian federation and decisions of the Armenian National Council in Tiflis were political developments, not automatic consequences of a military order. The Republic of Armenia dates its foundation to 28 May 1918; the Council’s published statement assuming authority is dated 30 May. Distinguishing a commemorated foundation date from the date of a document resolves an apparent contradiction.

Three kinds of evidence help a learner investigate Sardarapat. A museum photograph of the Fifth Regiment records a group associated with the battle, but by itself does not establish where each soldier fought. A public appeal by Silikyan, such as his call of 24 May, shows how a commander sought more participation; its persuasive language should not be read as a neutral count of troops. The memorial complex built in 1968 for the fiftieth anniversary shows how later generations chose to express the victory in architecture.

Start a timeline with six verbs: Alexandropol falls on 15 May; the defense is assigned on 16 May; Sardarapat is occupied on 21 May; Armenian forces recover it on 22 May; the flank is threatened on 27 May; the advance continues through 29 May. Below it add the political dates of 28 May, 30 May, and 4 June. Use a different color for operations and political decisions so that two simultaneous processes remain distinguishable.